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CURRENT DECISIONS
to Reitman v. Mulkey demonstrates that where any implications of a
restrictive racial covenant is apparent the state cannot lend its support or
give effect by its courts to such arrangements merely because they are
not expressedly stated.
Gary E. Legner
Federal Procedure-STANDING OF CLASS REPRESENTING ORGANIZA-
TIONS. In compliance with a previously valid non-discriminatory con-
solidation policy, the Morrilton, Arkansas, Board of Education dis-
missed all seven teachers of a Negro high school in order to implement
a desegregation plan. This action brought by two of the Negro teachers,
the Arkansas Teachers Association, Inc. (ATA), and the U.S. Govern-
ment as intervenor, was an appeal' from a judgment of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court dismissing the complaint on its merits. The appellants sought
an injunction requiring the employment of high school teachers with-
out regard to race, and the reassignment of elementary teachers and
pupils on a basis which disregards race. Alternatively, appellants sought
relief by money damages, and the presentation and implementation of
a plan of reorganization of the school system on a non-racial basis.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that the Board of Education must
give preference to the dismissed teachers in filling future vacancies also
found that the ATA had standing as a party plaintiff to bring action
on a constitutional question in behalf of its members.3
It is a general rule, that in order to have standing to litigate a consti-
tutional question, one must be asserting the right in his own behalf;4
and that a class action must be brought by a member of the class rather
than, as here, by a class representing organization. 5 In the past, standing
to representative organizations has only been allowed in absence of com-
pliance with the above rules where:
(1) an attempt to assert rights as individuals might result in forfeit-
ing the protection of those rights.0
1. Smith v. The Bd. of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
2. d. at 773.
3. The court also reached the constitutional question involved holding the School
Board's action deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the four-
teenth Amendment.
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Commented on in 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAMnc, Sec.
17.07 (2d ed. 1964). "An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who,
by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced."
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a).
6. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-460 (1958).
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(2) an organization litigates the scope of the constitutional protec-
tion afforded its members to act collectively. 1
(3) courts have devolved upon parties a duty to protect constitu-
tional rights of others and suit is instituted in performance of
that duty.8
Here, the ATA falls in none of the defined categories.
In holding that the ATA had sufficient standing to bring the suit,
the court declared that the general rule requiring a party to prosecute
a constitutional right in his own behalf is only a rule of practice which
may be outweighed by the need to protect fundamental rights.9 Tech-
nical rules of representation must give way if the need under a broad
constitutional policy is great enough.'0
To substantiate the need in the instant case for a liberal evaluation
of the requirement of standing, the court distinguished four pertinent
factors:
(1) There is an element of deterrence, through fear of reprisal, when
one makes his own assertion of constitutional rights.
(2) The possibility exists that the individual will lose interest in the
litigation if and when he obtains other employment."
(3) Integrated pupils possess appropriate concern about racial alloca-
tion of faculty. 2
(4) The ATA is faced with the possibility that dismissals will ad-
versely affect it as an entity through the loss of its membership
and financial support.13
In holding that the ATA had standing as a real party in interest to
bring an action on behalf of Negro school teachers, the court also de-
cided indirectly the question of whether a class action can be brought
by an association which is not technically an individual member of the
class. They dismissed the objection found in 23 (a) of the Federal Rules
7. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8. Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
9. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
10. The court is vague in its definition of what constitutes sufficient need, but it
can be seen that in an emotional area such as civil rights, the need would be sufficiently
great.
11. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64-65, n.6 (1963).
12. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965); Bradley v. School Board, 382 U.S. 103,
105 (1965).
13. Supra, note 4.
[Vol. 9:2,42
CURRENT DECISIONS
of Civil Procedure requiring a class action to be brought by a member
of the class by saying that because the ATA was found to be a real
party in interest under 17 (a) of the Federal Rules, it was also a proper
party under 23 (a). 4
Consequently, the court, in the case at bar, has sparked a controversy
because, by its own admission, the case "does not fit precisely certain
of the categories in this area where standing has been recognized."
The need to protect fundamental rights seems to be the key concept
behind the court's rationale in the instant case. This decision appears to
be a restatement of the court's power to determine what the representa-
tion criterion shall be. In so doing it affirms the equitable right to shirk
off blind adherence to technical rules when the needs of the public are
at stake and, thereby, helps to preserve and maintain flexibility in the
law.
Robert Wick
Workmen's Compensation-REcovERY FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS UN-
DER FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT. Demko, a prisoner in the Federal
Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, was injured on March 12,
1962 while performing assigned maintenance work. He was awarded
compensation' under the statutory provision for compensation of in-
mates so injured.' Subsequently, the respondent brought this action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act3 in the
Federal District Court which entered judgment in favor of the re-
spondent. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,4 finding
that here compensation was not an exclusive remedy, thus holding
contra to the view adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second
14. 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTcE, § 23.04, at 3419 (2d ed. 1964).
1. On his release from prison, Demko was to be awarded $180 per month to continue
so long as his disability continued which was later increased to $245.31 per month.
2. "The Corporation . . . is authorized to employ the fund and any earnings that
may accrue to the corporation as operating capital in performing the duties imposed
by this chapter; in the repair, alteration, erection and maintenance of industrial or other
assignments; in paying under rules and regulation promulgated by the Attorney General,
compensation to inmates employed in any industry, or performing outstanding services
in institutional operations, and compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries
suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with maintenance or
operation of the institution where confined. In no event shall compensation be paid in
a greater amount than that provided in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act." 18
U.S.C. § 4126 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1961).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1946).
4. Demko v. United States, 350 F.2d 698 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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